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ABSTRACT

The experiences of presidents of small colleges in their role as crisis manager are discussed. Attention is directed to: problems confronting the presidents of threatened colleges; presidential actions necessary for institutional renewal; the personal characteristics of the successful crisis manager/president; and how presidential behaviors compare to theories of crisis management. Crisis is defined as declining enrollments and continuing deficit budgets severe enough that closing, merging, or moving the institutions were contemplated. Data were obtained from three sources: personal experiences of presidents; intensive case studies of three small, private colleges that confronted a crisis and were renewed; and a national survey of 19 such institutions. The case studies used participant observation, interviews, and review of archival data. The national survey began with a review of the literature on institutional renewal, after which 74 institutional renewal strategies were identified. Based on these strategies an instrument was developed to survey trustees, administrators, faculty, and others at a sample of small private colleges that had faced a crisis and been renewed. Respondents ranked the strategies and 22 emerged as significant to organizational revitalization. (SW)

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The College President as Crisis Manager

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This paper was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of Higher Education held at the Palmer House Hotel in Chicago, Illinois, March 15-17, 1985. This paper was reviewed by ASHE and was judged to be of high quality and of interest to others concerned with the research of higher education. It has therefore been selected to be included in the ERIC collection of ASHE conference papers.

Abstract

Colleges increasingly face declining enrollments, loss of funds, and burgeoning costs. Public colleges have recently experienced these effects, but many small, private colleges have endured prolonged threats to their existence. The paper examines the experiences of small college presidents in their role as crisis manager. Data from three sources: the personal experiences of a small college president, intensive case studies of three, small, private colleges that confronted a crisis and were renewed, and a national survey of nineteen such institutions identified the actions and personal characteristics of the crisis manager/president and tested the findings against the literature on crisis management.

The College President As Crisis Manager

The problems facing higher education for over a decade have been well documented (Alm, Ehrle, and Webster; 1977; Bailey, 1982; Behrens, 1972; Cheit, 1971; and Jellema, 1972). The expectation that those problems will continue for the next two decades is similarly substantiated (Dresch, 1974; Duffy, 1976; Kauffman, 1982; New York State Higher Education Department, 1980). Difficulties, in the main, appear environmentally produced; e.g., uncertain economic conditions, changing demographics, and a growing skepticism about the value of higher education, particularly a liberal arts education. These adverse conditions have left few, if any, institutions untouched, but the extent of hardship has varied by region, state, and type of institution. An increasing number of public colleges are suffering the effects of enrollment decline and the loss of resources, but small private colleges have endured the most protracted and severe threats to their existence. These institutions, often characterized by limited endowments, small enrollments, moderate selectivity and relative obscurity, are clearly the most assailable by today's unstable environment (Hammond, 1984).

In spite of their vulnerability, a number of these small, private institutions have been revitalized following an organizational crisis. The paper melds information from three data sources to discuss the presidents of these institutions and the forces, both personal and extrapersonal (Martorana and Kuhns, 1975), that they confronted as they worked to renew their faltering colleges.

Data Source: The study included data from the personal experiences of a small college president who served successfully as a crisis manager/president; intensive case studies of three small, private colleges, confronted by crisis and renewed; and a 1983 national survey of nineteen such colleges.

The paper has four objectives:

1. To identify the problems confronting the presidents of threatened colleges;
2. To identify the presidential actions necessary for institutional renewal;
3. To identify the personal characteristics of the successful crisis manager/president; and
4. To test those behaviors and charactertistics against the theories of crisis management.

Methods or techniques: The three case studies utilized participant observation, interviews, and review of archival data. The researcher spent from four to six weeks on each campus, observing, attending meetings, interviewing participants, and reading histories, reports, financial documents, minutes and newspaper articles. Although the researcher entered the field with some broad questions in mind, the intent was to allow themes and information to emerge from the data. The data were analyzed through the procedure of content analysis, which objectively and systematically categorized the messages found in the data (Holsti, 1969). The coded data were then interpreted by tying the findings to existing theory or by proposing new concepts (Conrad, 1982).

The national survey included two phases, each employing a central and separate methodology. Phase one identified key strategies from the literature on institutional renewal. Using prespecified criteria for strategy selection, seventy-four strategies in eleven categories were identified as significant to institutional renewal. The strategies were then used to develop an instrument for surveying four groups of participants, i.e. trustees, administrators, faculty, and knowledgeable others, at each of the previously identified national sample of institutions (small, private colleges that had faced a crisis and been

renewed). Respondents rank ordered the strategies according to their importance and effectiveness and also added strategies, not listed, but considered important and effective. Following the use of descriptive statistics, twenty-two strategies emerged as significant to organizational revitalization.

The college president recorded his experiences as a crisis manager in detail. That information was then analyzed by a researcher through comparison of the president's experiences with the data from the case studies and the survey. From these multiple sources of information a pattern emerged in the behavior of organizational members, the personal characteristics and actions of the crisis manager/presidents, and in the changes which occurred at these institutions. These multiple sources of information, explored through both case study and survey methods, provided a chain of evidence for the study. Systematic accumulation of proof occurred by compiling frequencies and distributions of activities, beliefs and interactions.

For the purpose of this research, a crisis was defined as declining enrollments and continuing deficit budgets of such severity that closing, merging or moving the institution was contemplated. Renewal meant reversal of this condition, including enrollment growth over several years and elimination of budget deficits during the same time period.

Although the findings presented apply only to small private colleges in crisis, as more public institutions confront similar issues, there are indications that the same organizational behaviors are present and the same leadership qualities may be required to renew the institution. It appears that the critical element is not whether the institution is public or private, but whether it is in crisis.

Theoretical Framework

Present day observers have described the turbulent environmental contexts in which organizations now exist (Drucker, 1980; Richardson, 1980). Adaptation in such an environment is hampered by the increasing rate and complexity of change. These drawbacks notwithstanding, Baldridge and Tierney (1979) believe that "The ability of private colleges to survive hinges on the effectiveness with which their management adapts to this turbulent environment" (p. 206). To complicate matters further, Hoffer (1951) noted that fear of the future caused organizational members to cling to the present; whereas, faith in the future enhanced their acceptance of change. The challenge for decision makers and administrators is to build faith in the future among organizational members by identifying organizational problems and taking action to resolve them. It is therefore important that appropriately validated presidential actions for alleviating institutional crisis be made available to institutions in distress.

The lives of organizations, like the lives of people, pass through various phases (Kimberly, Miles and Assocs., 1980). Like people, organizations grow older and undergo substantive changes. For long periods of time they are well functioning and robust, and in all apparent ways effective. At other times in their life cycles, they falter, and as with a person whose health fails and requires restorative measures, special interventions are necessary to guarantee organizational survival and renewed health. If the organization falters in life threatening ways, heroic measures may be required to stem the crisis. In the language of organizational theory, "crisis management" defines such stringent measures. Extensive literature exists on the theories of crisis management (Bailey, 1982; Cyert, 1978; Drucker, 1980: Keller, 1983; Mayhew, 1979; Mingle, 1981), but little of the literature discusses the testing of those theories by the leaders of colleges in crisis. The paper addresses those issues.

The Climate for Change. By definition, a crisis denotes an emergency involving the life of a person or, metaphorically, the life of an organization, which must somehow be reversed. A crisis implies that the outcome can go either way. It also signifies that a turning point has been reached, and matters will quickly turn worse--or with proper intervention--better. But how does one recognize a crisis? Kerchner and Schuster (1982) have defined two types of crisis, manifest and opaque. "The manifest crisis is readily apparent, its menacing nature speaks for itself and compels the close attention of management" (p. 122-123). The opaque crisis "often reflects a chronic problem which, while weighty, does not dramatize itself" (p. 123). The problem of the leader in either case is to define the crisis and convince others that it is real in order to develop an organizational mind set for change. Finding such a leader is difficult (Drucker, 1980; Levine and Rubin, 1980), because the skills necessary to renew an institution in crisis are quite different from those used by the leader of a growing institution.

Crisis Management: Lee Iacocca addressed one of the problems confronting the crisis manager as he reflected upon the task he shouldered as Chrysler's chief executive in 1979. He remarked that the worst part of a crisis is that the leadership has almost no time to plan a way out of it. Strategic analysis, long range planning, reflective thinking--these are all luxuries that an organizational crisis hardly affords. The need to act displaces time to reflect, and quick decision-making becomes a key to crisis resolution.

But a lack of planning time is not the only obstacle, nor certainly the most defeating one, that a crisis manager must face. Perhaps the greatest difficulty lies in the fact that one may expect the crisis to be resolved through rational, scientific approaches. That is simply not the case. As C. Wright Mills noted, "What is at issue is the very nature of man, the image we have of his limits and possibilities as man." Both physical nature and human

nature are capable of wild fantasy that cannot be imprisoned in narrow rationalist categories (Berlin, 1979). The crisis manager, often coming to the institution from outside, and those within the failing institution typically have different views of the organization. The insider's view of the college or university, is often pejoratively described by outsiders as an "ivory tower" perspective. This implies a separation from reality. The perspective of the insider is not separated from reality; it is a separate reality. Paludan, in his book Victims (1981) describes a situation parallel to the college's ivory tower in his description of those living in a mountain valley in North Carolina.

> Yet no one can move untouched in the patterns their past has shaped. History hurries near and, unlooked for, is upon us. Then what we are does not shelter, it imprisons. What we are, what we have spent so much time and so much care becoming, compels us to be true to ourselves, to respond our way, our own small treasured, hard-won way. It can be very unsuited to history's demands, and it can make us victims, too (1981, p. xiii).

Weick (1979) believes that groups fail to change for the same reasons attributed to individuals by Paludan.

> The phenomenon of group thinking is important because it demonstrates some of the dysfunctional consequences when people are dominated by a single schema and this domination becomes self-reinforcing. Having become true believers of a specific schema, group members direct their attention toward an environment and sample it in such a way that the true belief becomes self-validating and the group becomes even more fervent in its attachment to the schema (p. 52).

Shaw and Blum (1965) have attributed this behavior to "pluralistic ignorance," and Kaufman (1975) argues that,

> . . . probably the chief reason for the demise of organizations is change in their internal or external environments that renders ineffective their established processes of self-maintenance. Most organizations, to be sure, are capable of modifying those processes to some extent and are thus able to survive changes of modest proportions. But this capability is always circumscribed; organizational flexibility is sharply limited. . . Organizations often persist in courses of action that were previously beneficial even when new conditions necessitate new patterns of behavior. . . the norm is inflexibility of behavior (pp. 139-240).

The leader who perceives an impending or existing crisis finds that convincing others that a crisis exists and garnering their support the major challenge. One should begin work with the realization that inflexibility of behavior results from varying perceptions of the situation and not sheer obstinance. The crisis manager encounters at least three identifiable perceptions, one of which can be divided into two categories.

First, are those who deny or fail to perceive the existence of the crisis, and therefore, have no concept of the swiftness with which it may reach a point of no return. There are those at all levels of the organization, even some executive managers, who either cannot or will not accept the reality of a crisis, resolutely refusing to acknowledge the signs of impending organizational failure. One can postulate several possibilities for this nonacceptance. Previous leaders may not have discussed the severity of the institution's problems, thus provoking denial. Another possibility is that organizational members believe they have no physical defense against organizational decline, and their psychological defenses increase manifoldly (Kübler-Ross, 1969). Furthermore, acknowledging the failure of current organizational functions requires the recognition of a need for change, which members may not be ready to accept. These are some of the possibilities for denying that a crisis exists.

While one group remains unapproachable regarding the possibility of failure, another shows little or no concern for the imminent collapse. Typically, members of this group have little vested interest in the organization or if they once had such an interest, they no longer have. The reasons can run the gamut of psychological possibilities. Some may have been so disenfranchised by previous leadership that they see no reason to continue caring about the fate of the organization. Others may never have felt loyalty to the institution, but perceive it as merely the source of a job to be replaced when no longer viable. Still others assume no responsibility for the organization, believing it is the governing board's and administration's responsibility.

Finally, a third group clearly, perhaps even desperately, wants the organization to survive and flourish again, but this group contains two factions: those who readily give their confidence and allegiance to the crisis manager, and those who do so with reluctance. The first of these subgroups gives full support to the crisis manager, perhaps because its members are by nature team players, or maybe they view the leader as a savior who will lead the organization to safety. The second subgroup believes that changes must occur to overcome the crisis (often ready to declare their prescience by reminders to colleagues such as, "I've been saying this for years!"), but is pessimistic that anything can be done to alleviate the problems in this institution, or believe that this leader is not the one. If the current leader is management oriented, then what they need is a scholar, or if a scholar, then someone with better interpersonal skills, and so on and so on.

To counter the foot dragging that occurs within the stymied organization the leader must introduce his or her own view of reality, an unfaltering conviction that the organization can be saved with the introduction of new strategies. Finding and implementing those strategies is the manager's major concern. In the limited time available to resolve the crisis, the leader's energy must be focused on the development of clearcut directives which must be followed fully and without hesitation throughout the organization. In a less demanding situation, there might be time to lobby different constituencies to win their commitment to the leader's vision, but in the crisis situation there is simply not enough time available. In the depths of an organizational crisis, the maxim credited to Cable News Network's Ted Turner unfailingly applies: "Lead, follow, or get out of the way."

The success of the organization's recovery will be determined in large part by the quality of the strategies which the leadership devises and especially by their timely implementation. Perhaps this is why some believe "the manager's style of leadership must be active and

intrusive" (Behn, 1980, p. 613). Peck has described successful crisis managers as entrepreneurial: administering through others, intuitive, opportunity conscience, and mission and purpose oriented (Peck, 1982). This style of leadership is typically found at what Karl Weick has called a different kind of organization, one that "values improvisation rather than forecasting, dwells on opportunities rather than constraints, discovers new actions rather than defends past actions, values arguments more highly than serenity and encourages doubt and contradiction rather than belief" (Peters & Waterman, 1982, p. 7). Peters and Waterman contend that innovative organizations "are especially adroit at continually responding to change of any sort in their environments" (1982, p. 12). Research supports this position indicating that more institutions succumb from failure to act than from the failure of their actions (Hammond, 1984).

But how does one know which action to take? Before devising strategies, one needs information about the organization. The importance of accurate information to organizational wellbeing is cited by numerous authors. Scott (1981) argued, from an open system perspective, that one criterion for assessing institutional effectiveness was the information acquisition and processing capabilities of the organization. Galbraith (1972) further posited that, ". . . the greater the task uncertainty, the greater the amount of information that must be processed in order to insure effective performance. . ." (p. 532). Roy (1954) commented on the importance of effective communication to organizational production, describing it as "a matter of instituting interactional processes that engender ideas, sentiments, and plans for action held in common (p. 266). Finally, Katz and Kahn (1978) noted that inputs "furnish signals to the structure about the environment and about its own functioning in relation to the environment" (p. 26).

The necessity of accurate information notwithstanding, one of the major problems a crisis manager confronts is trusting the quality of information received. At base, this is a problem

of organizational politics. Even in the best of times, different groups within the organization seek to influence the information provided management. Information includes data and its interpretation by those who are presumably experts in a particular area. Virtually all data are subject to manipulation to yield vastly different inferences and conclusions. And, consciously or unconsciously, different constitutencies in an organization will color information to suit their own needs and purposes (Schneeweiss and Drake, 1981).

But in a crisis, the rigor of data interpretation becomes a life and death matter. The organization cannot tolerate mistakes in strategy formulation caused by "tainted" information. This is precisely why crisis management demands the greatest available expertise in leadership, and leaders who are integrated thinkers that can ferret out manipulated data or colored inferences. Harland Cleveland, the Director of the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs, says, "The hallmark of specialized experts is their sense of doubt and gloom. The mark of integrated thinkers is their sense of new possibilities and actions" (1972, p. 50). Often the experts are the faculty who have focused on one area of specialization, while the crisis manager has a much broader view of both the internal and external environment.

The leader's broader perception often comes through the use of boundary spanning persons as information resources. Organizations are boundary maintaining systems, but they cannot be closed to external influence; therefore, certain members must assume boundary spanning roles for information gathering and interpretation (Aldrich and Herker, 1977). At colleges these roles are typically filled by board members, the president, advancement and admissions officers, etc. Boundary personnel take on critical importance in rapidly changing social environments, because they are more "doubting, naive, or uninformed," and therefore, are more likely to ignore presumed constraints, interjecting new strategies to the advantage of the floundering organization (Aldrich and Herker, 1977).

An organization increases its boundary spanning activities in order to understand and influence the external environment. "It attempts to influence clients and consumers, if not to control them directly, through expenditure on information and advertising" (Katz and Kahn, 1978, p. 131). Parsons (1960) observed that "A very important aspect of what is sometimes called the struggle for power in a society consists. . .(of) competition for support and authorization among the many different organized interests of the society" (pp. 90-91).

Those who succeed at crisis management are those who collect accurate information and use it to "make the right decision and to make the decision right" (Schmidtlein, 1974, p. 11). Action must replace reflection, but the leader understands that human nature militates toward organizational inertia, for human nature is a mosaic of beliefs and emotions, including some less desirable traits such as selfishness, irresponsibility, jealousy, and often a penchant for self-destruction that can carry an organization with it if left unchecked. For these reasons the crisis manager must constantly confront problems, using the organization as a resource to respond, while recognizing that the leader serves as the lightening rod until the crisis passes.

The Characteristics of the Crisis Manager/President

Three case studies of colleges, confronted by crisis and renewed, provide additional examples of the characteristics of the crisis manager/president. Perhaps the single most visible characteristic of these leaders was their self-confidence--their belief that they could overcome organizational decline. This characteristic was extremely important, because it influenced all other action. The data provide several examples. One president observed, "I see myself as a winner, not a loser. It's a matter of attitude." A trustee who interviewed this individual before his appointment called him "success-oriented." She said, "He exuded

energy and brightness. He knew what needed to be done, and he knew that he had the skills to accomplish it." Another president said, "I have never felt strained in my activities here. I have enjoyed it as a logistical game."

The behavioral qualities of this type of individual are described well by Lippitt in Organizational Renewal:

> He concerns himself with actually working out a problem or an idea. He is interested in tackling situations confronted by the organization and in what will change them; he sees organizational life as a set of problems, not as a mystery, or a set of absolutes, or a systematic idealogy. He sees the organization as a resource which should be equipped to respond appropriately to the task or problem confronting it. He encourages and lives with provisional solutions. His existential approach sees the potency and capability of the system to solve problems, even though he recognizes no simple, all encompassing approach (1969, p. 18).

The case study leaders were confident that for every problem there was a solution. As Lippitt (1969) notes, the organization guided by this philosophy views tradition as secondary; the problem's solution as primary. This may explain why the crisis manager is often above the institution and not of the institution, typically, an outsider, not an insider, thus less committed to institutional traditions.

Since colleges, like most organizations, adhere to tradition, the leaders found that plans for change often met strong organizational resistance. These leaders were able to overcome this resistance, however, by convincing members that a crisis existed. An administrator explained, "When the faculty was presented with two choices, survival or nonsurvival, they realized that in order for the institution to survive they must accept change." Adversity proved to be the catalyst that allowed previously resisted changes.

Just as these leaders capitalized on adversity to motivate change, they also realized that timely action was critical to organizational revitalization. They evaluated strategies and

moved quickly to implement plans. This behavior is contrary to common practice and belief regarding administration. Many hold the view of William Rainey Harper, early president of the University of Chicago, who wrote, "The president should never do today what by any possible means he can postpone until tomorrow" (1938, p. 185). Perhaps the discrepancy between this view and that of the case study leaders is related to the condition of the organization. Cyert tells us that a growing organization requires little central action but the contracting organization demands action by central administration (1978). Nevertheless, many leaders are reticent to exert strong control.

Douglas McGregor offers a possible explanation for this reticence in his essay, "On Leadership," written shortly before leaving the presidency of Antioch College:

> Before coming to Antioch, I had observed and worked with top executives as an advisor in a number of organizations. I thought I knew how they felt about their responsibilities and what led them to behave as they did. I even thought I could create a role for myself that would enable me to avoid some of the difficulties they encountered. I was wrong! I believed, for example, that a leader could operate successfully as a kind of advisor to his organization. I thought I could avoid being 'boss.' Unconsciously, I suspect, I hoped to duck the unpleasant necessity of making mistakes and taking the consequences. I thought that maybe I could operate so that everyone would like me -- that 'good human relations' would eliminate all discord and disappointment. I could not have been more wrong (1966, p. 67).

Undoubtedly the difficulty in assuming responsibility for action is related to the frequent negative response of organizational participants. Change leaders have often been accused of "lacking academic instincts, of usurping faculty privileges and trampling on sensitive egos" (1979, p. 32). On the other hand, their critics marvel at their success in balancing the budget and increasing enrollments. The ambivalence seems to be what Maccoby (1979) has described as the conflict between the conscious wish for autonomy and yearnings for protection and dependency.

The leaders from the case studies exhibited a willingness to take risks, and at times they suffered disappointment in their risk taking. When strategies failed, they accepted

disappointment and followed the rule of finance that writes off losses and sets forth on a new venture. Hruby, in his monograph, A Survival Kit for Invisible Colleges (1973), relates an experience from the history of Aquinas College where considerable time, energy, and hope were put into a plan for an engineering program that was not instituted. The college gained a great deal, however, from the planning experience which was later used in a highly successful community education program. The engineering program was written off, but the knowledge gained in the planning was beneficial to the college in its later endeavors.

The fact that these leaders did not succumb to disappointment and failure, or if so, only momentarily, is related to another characteristic discernible in their behavior, indefatigable energy. Their energy was apparent in their undelayed analysis of institutional problems, their search for solutions, and finally, their intense effort in implementing the plans. They spent endless hours bringing their plans to fruition. Their commitment to the problem's solution was evident throughout the revitalization process from planning through implementation.

These crisis managers exhibited a confidence, a belief that they and their organization could overcome adversity. That confidence manifested itself in their actions. They (1) changed the organization in the face of adversity; (2) used adversity to overcome organizational resistance; (3) made timely decisions and accepted responsibility for them; (4) wrote off disappointments, and (5) maintained a high level of commitment to the institution throughout the revitalization process.

Institutional Renewal

Having examined the behaviors and characteristics of individuals within these institutions, it seems useful to examine the changes that occurred within one of the institutions. As an institutional prototype of renewal, let us examine Cazenovia College, Cazenovia, New York,

in 1974. Cazenovia College was bankrupt in May, 1974, following several years of declining enrollment, mounting deficits and no apparent hope. The College Board of Trusteees voted to close the doors; however, due to the efforts of the local community and enrolled students, the Board reopened the College two weeks after its announced closing, and initiated a search for a new president, who took office in June, 1975. Under the new president's leadership two five-year reorgnizational plans were created that brought about dramatic changes in the life of the College. During the first five years, 1975-1980, key activities included clearly defining the College's mission, reversing fiscal decline, establishing presidential leadership, revising the academic program, restructuring the governing board, reorganizing the College's management and developing aggressive admissions and development programs. At the end of this period, the College was revitalized.

The second five-year plan, 1981-1986, witnessed other major accomplishments. The faculty was expanded with development and evaluation components added, the physical plant was restored and three new facilities renovated or added, property holdings were increased, the College moved from single sex to coeducation and the admissions effort gained exponentially in strength. It should be noted that the second five-year plan was completed in three years--by 1984! To fully appreciate the extent of the revitalization, Table I compares the college in 1974 to 1984.

Recognizing that a crisis exists and obtaining a crisis manager/president to introduce change are critically important. Yet, another question remains--what strategies should be used to renew the faltering institution?

Strategies for Renewal

In a 1983 study of 19 colleges that were renewed following a crisis, Grinnell found 22 strategies deemed important for revitalization by faculty, administrators, and trustees. They are rank ordered by their significance below:

Strategy

1. Balance the budget as soon as possible
2. Insure presidential leadership in the advancement (fund raising) effort
3. Encourage and support strong presidential leadership (faculty and trustee support is especially important)
4. Develop and implement courses/degree porgrams that are popular with students and consistent with the institutional mission
5. Develop institution-wide policies for fiscal procedures (e.g., development of annual budget, purchasing, income-expenditure analyses, etc.)
6. Increase the sources of private giving
7. Implement an institutional self-study to reaffirm or change the mission and direction of the college
8. Link academic planning and budgeting
9. Conduct an analysis of all programs
10. Involve all college constituencies (i.e., trustees, faculty, staff, students, alumni) in the advancement effort
11. Encourage leaders (existing or new) who have a sense of institutional mission and an awareness of innovative opportunities with organizational support to affect change
12. Implement ongoing strategies and longrange planning processes

13. Develop performance criteria and data (cost of contributions, year to year comparisons, yield rates, etc.) for the evaluation of the advancement effort
14. Develop a new management information system (or improve the existing one)
15. Offer courses/programs at locations convenient to students (e.g., in residence halls, off campus, etc.)
16. Use competency based learning objectives for curriculum revisions
17. Implement strong fiscal management with one senior administrator taking responsibility
18. Improve the physical facilities
19. Insure a strong board of trustees
20. Use prayer (recommended by several denominational colleges)
21. Remove incompetent/negative faculty and staff
22. Develop stronger ties with the denomination (if church affiliation exists)

Overall, two themes emerge as significant from this list of 22 strategies: (1) the need for internal control of the organization, represented in fiscal affairs, leadership, self-assessment/planning, and information processing; (2) response to the organization's external environment coordinated through the admissions and institutional advancement programs, and the board of trustees. One caution is necessary, although the strategies have been identified, implementation, by whom and at what point in the organization's history is also critical. The effective management of an organization in crisis is a complex and multidimensional problem. As both reality and theory demonstrate, there exist no all encompassing solutions. Yet the presentation and discussion of the theoretical constraints of crisis management, as well as the day to day efforts of individuals within organizations facing crisis provides a sense of belief, purpose and opportunity for overcoming organizational instability.

Many will reject the crisis management model as abhorrent to the academic setting. The implementation of strong central control, the facilitation of stringent fiscal measures and the rigors of renewal strategies may be perceived as inappropirate. Whether the end justifies the means must be answered by each institution in light of its own history and potential future, but as more institutions are confronted by declining enrollments, loss of funds, and escalating costs, they require new kinds of leadership. A study of this sort can provide helpful advice to governing boards in their choice of leaders. The leaders who face the problems of organizational renewal can also benefit from the knowledge that their situations are not unique, nor are solutions untested. The study provides a prototype for the successful crisis manager/president.

Table I

	1974	1984
	Closed early May, 1974 - reopened late May, 1974	
a.	299 students; 385 applications	a. 800 students, 168% increase; 1,115 applications, 190% increase
b.	($1,150,000) in short term debt	b. 0 short term debt
c.	($6,000,000) in long-term plant debt	c. ($2,500,000) plant debt (down 58%)
d.	Salary scale cut by 10%	d. Salary scale competitive - faculty at 50th percentile on AAUP rankings
	Fall, 1974	**Fall, 1984**
e.	Entering freshman class 202	e. Entering freshman class 465, 130% increase
f.	Returning sophomore class 140	f. Returning sophomore class 354, 153% increase
g.	Plant in disrepair	g. Plant - no deferred maintenance. Three buildings completely rehabilitated; $500,000 renovation of heating plant with energy measures that will pay back in 7 years or less; new equine center (18,000 sq. ft.); addition of 11,000 sq. ft. of classroom space
h.	Single sex woman's college	h. Co-ed college 1983-84
i.	Scholarships to 30% of students, $110,000	i. Scholarship aid to 82% of students, $1.2 million, a 10,000% increase over 1974
j.	Endowment ($675,000)	j. Endowment, $6.2 million
k.	Liberal Arts curriculum	k. Career-oriented college. Deleted 9 programs, added 13 programs
l.	Faculty: FTE 16	l. Faculty: 33 full-time and 45 part-time
m.	Budget $2.4 million	m. Operating budget $7 million; 281.6% increase
n.	Accreditation status in jeopardy	n. Reaccredited in 1981 by Middle States Association of Colleges and Universities
o.	No computers on campus	o. Computer literate faculty in 1984 with 42 terminals on campus, full-time computer center director 1984
p.	Advancement funds used for operations, 10% of operating budget	p. All advancement monies used for endowment; none of operating budget from fund raising

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